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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
practitioner; third, this opportunity is especially true in professions
such as architecture and engineering wherein the client relationship is
not confidential; fourth, the advantages and disadvantages of the
corporate form could be made available as a matter of choice without
disturbing, and perhaps enhancing, the image of the architect in the
client's eyes; fifth, the trend is toward statutes permitting the corpo-
rate practice not only of architecture, but also of other professions;
and last, the practitioners would undoubtedly be well rewarded by an
objective and reasoned analysis of the problem.
Almost four decades elapsed before the resistance to contempo-
rary design was overcome among the architects themselves; indeed,
there are many who still resist. The same indiscretion well might
keep the profession forty years behind the economic metamorphosis
of the atomic age. An analysis made too late may be extensive and
nevertheless be too little. All too applicable, then, would be the epi-
taph: Sic transit gloria mundi.75
GEORGE M. WHITE
Waiver of Ohio Dead Man Statute
HISTORY
At common law, one interested in the outcome of litigation was
incompetent to testify.1 In 1850, the Ohio legislature removed inter-
est as a disqualification for a witness ;2 however, interest as a disquali-
fication for a party remained until 1853.' In that year, parties were
made generally competent to testify, with a few major exceptions.
Foremost among these was the disability of a party to testify against
the executor or administrator of a deceased person as to facts occur-
ring prior to the deceased's death.4  Between the time of its enact-
ment and the present date, other disqualifying provisions were added
to the Dead Man Statute. Today, the statute provides as follows:
A party shall not testify when the adverse party is the guardian
or trustee of either a deaf and dumb or an insane person, or of a child of
a deceased person, or is an executor or administrator, or claims or de-
fends as heir, grantee, assignee, devisee, or legatee of a deceased person.5
From time to time, the legislature modified the scope of the statute
by adding exceptions to the basic disqualification clause quoted above.
These exceptions will be discussed in subsequent sections of this note.
In order to appreciate the problems incident to waiver, it is first
necessary to examine in detail the nature of the disqualification im-
posed by the Dead Man Statute.
75. THOMAs A KEMPIS, IMITATIO CmRsTI, ch. 3 § VI (1450).
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PURPOSE
The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the Dead Man Statute
was enacted (1) to protect the estate from fraud and perjury,6 and
(2) to place the parties to an action upon an equal basis with respect
to the admission and exclusion of evidence. z
In removing the bar of incompetency from witnesses and parties
generally, the legislature was guided by the principle that the adverse
party was able to protect himself by his own testimony, and that the
matter of interest affected only the party's credibility.8 However,
with respect to testimony of a party against the estate of a deceased
person, the legislature apparently believed that justice could best be
served by sealing the lips of the adverse party "when the lips of one
party... are dosed by death."9
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE
Because the disqualification of an adverse party in the Dead Man
Statute constitutes an exception to the general statutory provision
making all parties competent witnesses,' 0 the courts have consistently
stated that the disability provision should be strictly construed in
favor of the admissibility of evidence." This maxim would make
easy the task of construing the basic part of the statute but for the
last sentence of the section which provides as follows:
When a case is plainly within the reason and spirit of this section and
sections 2317.01 and 2317.02 of the Revised Code,' though not within
the strict letter, their principles shall be applied.
12
Prior to the enactment of the "reason and spirit" clause, and be-
1. See generally WIGMORE, EVDENCE §§ 575-77 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Act to Improve the Law of Evidence, 48 Ohio Laws 33 (1856).
3. Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure, 51 Ohio Laws 57, § 310 (1853).
4. Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure, 51 Ohio Laws 57, § 313 (1853).
5. OHIo REV. CODE § 2317.03 (Supp. 1959).
6. Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 165 N.E. 727 (1929); Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio
St. 596, 601-02, 10 N.E. 61, 64 (1887); Stevens v. Hartley, 13 Ohio St. 525, 531 (1862).
7. Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 596, 600, 10 N.E. 61, 64 (1887); Sternberger v. Hanna,
42 Ohio St. 305, 308 (1884); Hoover v. Jennings, 11 Ohio St. 624, 626 (1860); see also
O'Shaughnessy v. Stefft, 117 N.E.2d 734 (Ohio P. Ct. 1953).
8. Powell v. Powell, 78 Ohio St. 331, 335, 85 N.E. 541, 543 (1908).
9. Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 596, 602, 10 N.E. 61, 64 (1887).
10. OHIo REV. CODE 5 2317.01.
11. E.g., Smith v. Barrick, 151 Ohio St. 201, 207, 85 N.E.2d 101, 104 (1949); Torrance v.
Torrance, 147 Ohio St. 169, 174-75, 70 N.E.2d 365, 368 (1946); Stream v. Barnard, 120
Ohio St. 206, 210-11, 165 N.E. 727, 728 (1929); Cocldey Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St.
270, 276, 79 N.E. 478, 480 (1906); Bolen v. Humes, 94 Ohio App. 1, 6, 114 N.E.2d 281,
284 (1951), motion to certify denied, Mar. 19, 1952.
12. OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.03 (Supp. 1959). Section 2317.02 governs the admissibility
of privileged communications and acts.
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fore the Dead Man Statute was amended to include assignees, a case
arose concerning a chose in action which had been assigned by a de-
ceased person. The party adverse to the assignee was not deemed
incompetent to testify in view of the fact that the assignee was not
an executor, administrator, or grantee."3 The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the party adverse to such assignee was competent to testify
that he did not execute the promissory note concerned in the litiga-
tion, even though this testimony could not be controverted by that of
the payee because of his demise. 4 The court conceded that in order
to be consistent with the other provisions of the Dead Man Statute,
the assignee of a chose in action from a deceased person should be
accorded the same protection as was expressly granted to those per-
sons named in the statute. However, the court considered itself
bound by the precise wording of the statute.-5 The next year, the
legislature amended the statute by adding the "reason and spirit"
clause.
The inference would seem to be reasonable that the legislature by the
insertion of the clause intended to abrogate the construction requiring
absolute particularity, which had theretofore been applied .... "I
Rather than clarifying the legislative intent as to the construction
of the statute, the "reason and spirit" clause created a two-fold di-
lemma for the courts: (1) Did the legislature, by the enactment of
this clause, intend that the courts give a liberal construction to the
statutory provision making all parties competent, or a liberal con-
struction to the statutory provisions which disqualify witnesses and
evidence?' (2) Did the legislature intend the "reason and spirit"
clause to apply in favor of the admission of evidence (under the ex-
ceptions to the statute) or in favor of the exclusion of evidence (un-
der the disqualifying clause) ?
In practice, the "reason and spirit" clause has been given little
effect by the courts. An early supreme court case, Cochran v.
Almack,' s held that:
... [I] f a case is provided for, by the terms of either of the sections, no
occasion can arise for invoking the spirit and reason of the statute to
supply the omission of its letter or terms.' 9
13. Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure, 51 Ohio Laws 57, § 313 (1853).
14. Elliott v. Shaw, 32 Ohio St. 431 (1877).
15. 1d. at 434.
16. Newman v. Newman, 103 Ohio St. 230, 236, 133 N.E. 70, 72 (1921).
17. OHIo REv. CODE § 2317.02 excludes privileged communications and acts; OHIO REV.
CODE § 2317.03 (Supp. 1959) is the Dead Man Statute. One appellate court, deciding a case
under Ohio General Code § 11495, which provided that the "reason and spirit" clause applied
to the "next three preceding sections," held that this wording excluded its operation with re-
spect to the Dead Man Statute, which was also contained in General Code § 11495. Herman
v. Soal, 71 Ohio App. 310, 315, 49 N.E.2d 109, 111-12 (1942).
18. 39 Ohio St. 314 (1883).
19. - Id. at 316.
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In this case, defendant admitted liability on a promissory note, but
claimed as a defense payment to an agent of plaintiff. Since the
agent had died prior to the trial, plaintiff objected to defendant's
testimony on the ground that it was incompetent because of the "rea-
son and spirit" clause, there being no witness to the alleged transac-
tion who was available to contradict defendant's testimony. As indi-
cated above, the majority held that defendant was a competent wit-
ness to the transaction, because he was made so by the predecessor to
Ohio Revised Code section 2317.01, and his competency was not ex-
pressly removed by the Dead Man Statute, which applies only to
parties.
To the dissent, "all the evils of permitting one to prove, by his
own oath, his claim against a deceased person's estate, applies to the
case."120  As previously noted, one of the judicially ascertained pur-
poses of the statute is to place the parties to an action upon an equal
basis with respect to the admission and exclusion of evidence. In
view of this, the dissent appears to be well taken. "Indeed, if ...
[defendant] was competent, under such circumstances, to prove the
payment by his own oath, I am at a loss to imagine, a case in which
the provision should be applied."'"
In almost every case in which the "reason and spirit" clause has
been considered, the court has stated the purpose of the clause to be
to broaden the scope of the general competency statute and to liberal-
ize the exceptions to the Dead Man Statute which allow parties to
testify.22 Thus, the courts, in effect, have continued their strict con-
struction of the statute in favor of the admissibility of evidence.
",I Party"
The statute provides that "a party" shall not testify. The courts
have narrowly construed this term. It has been stated that one is not
a party to the suit if he does not have "a right to control the proceed-
ings, to make a defense, or to adduce and cross-examine witnesses.
' 23
Further, one against whom no relief is asked is not a party. 4
20. Id. at 318 (dissenting opinion).
21. Id. at 319 (dissenting opinion).
22. See Loney v. Walkey, 102 Ohio St. 18, 25, 130 N.E. 158, 160 (1921); Powell v. Powell,
78 Ohio St. 331, 339, 85 N.E. 541, 544 (1908); Cockley Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St.
270 (1906); Shaub v, Smith, 50 Ohio St. 648 (1893); Keyes v. Gore, 42 Ohio St. 211
(1884); Cochran v. Almack, 39 Ohio St. 314, 317 (1883); Butler v. Youngflesh, 68 Ohio
App. 342, 41 N.E.2d 147 (1941); Hess v. Clutz, 8 Ohio App. 57 (1917). But see New-
man v. Newman, 103 Ohio St. 230, 133 N.E. 70 (1921) (dictum); Snow v. Fulton, 51 Ohio
App. 514, 2 N.E.2d 12 (1936) (third party beneficiary not permitted to examine promisee in
action against promisor's estate, on basis of analogy to prohibition against testimony of the
assignor of a claim where assignee would not be permitted to testify). See note 57 infra and
accompanying text.
23. Butler v. Youngflesh, 68 Ohio App. 342, 344, 41 N.E.2d 147, 148 (1941).
24. Brocalsa Chemical Co. v. Langsenkamp, 32 F.2d 725 (6th Cit. 1929), reversing 21 F.2d
207 (S.D. Ohio 1927).
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The courts have defined party so as to exclude from its purview
nominal parties of record. 5 Thus, the husband of an heir at law,
who was a party of record, was held to be a nominal party and, there-
fore, competent to testify on behalf of his wife in her action to test
the validity of a will.26 Moreover, the courts have allowed the testi-
mony of one who is not a party of record even though his interests
will be directly affected by the result of the litigation. Thus, a gen-
eral manager, 27 a president, 28 or a director,29 may testify on behalf of
his corporation against the estate of a deceased person.30 The fact
that a corporation can act only through its agents has not swayed the
courts from their strict interpretation.3 1 Furthermore, the children, 2
parents,33 or spouse34 of a party are not incompetent to testify against
a decedent's estate,3 5 if they are not parties.
As has been noted, in many of these cases a witness has been al-
lowed to testify even though his interests would be affected by the
outcome of the litigation. Although this interest has not been deemed
to be sufficient to seal his lips, there is dictum to the effect that if the
witness was a necessary party, or if his rights would be determined
by the judgment, then the court might exclude the testimony on the
basis of the "reason and spirit" clause. 6
25. In re Estate of Butler, 137 Ohio St. 96, 28 N.E.2d 186 (1940) (creditor of decedent,
whose daim had been paid, held competent to testify in behalf of administrator in action to
surcharge the latter). See also Loney v. Walkey, 102 Ohio St. 18, 130 N.E. 158 (1921).
26. Wolf v. Powner, 30 Ohio St. 472 (1876); see also Baker v. Kellogg, 29 Ohio St. 663
(1876), and Bell v. Wilson, 17 Ohio St. 640 (1867), wherein the principal maker of a
promissory note was held to be a competent witness in a suit by the administrator of the payee
against the maker and the surety. In both cases the principal was not asserting a defense
against the administrator and, thus, was deemed not to be a "party" within the meaning of the
Dead Man Statute. It should be noted, however, that the same result could have been reached
on the basis that the principal, not having asserted a defense, was not really adverse in interest
to the administrator, thus making the statute inapplicable.
27. Cockley Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St. 270 (1906).
28. Brocalsa Chemical Co. v. Langsenkamp, 32 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1929); In re Estate of
Kennedy, 82 Ohio App. 359, 80 N.E.2d 810 (1948).
29. Lawson & Covode v. Farmer's Bank, 1 Ohio St. 206 (1853).
30. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Cornell, 41 Ohio St. 401 (1884) (per curiam); Parker v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 23 Ohio App. 535, 156 N.E. 231 (1925), where agent of corporation
was allowed to testify.
31. Cocldey Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St. 270, 277, 79 N.E. 478, 480 (1906).
32. Powell v. Powell, 78 Ohio St. 331, 85 N.E. 541 (1908). A fortiori, the agent of a non-
corporate party may testify on behalf of his principal in a suit against an administrator with
respect to a sale made by him to decedent. Shak v. Smith, 50 Ohio St. 648, 35 N.E. 503
(1893). .IP
33. Thompson v. Thompson, 18 Ohio St. 73 (1868); Schulte v. Hagemeyer, 16 Ohio App.
1 (1922), motion to certify denied, June 6, 1922.
34. Stupp v. Lear, 42 N.E.2d 681 (Ohio App. 1942); Hess v. Clutz, 8 Ohio App. 57 (1917).
35. See also Ryan v. O'Connor, 41 Ohio St. 368 (1884), wherein a trustee, who had con-
veyed trust property without the settlor's knowledge, was held competent to testify for the
settlor in a suit against the heirs of the transferee.
36. Ryan v. O'Connor, supra note 35, at 371 (if the trustee would have been a necessary
party, the "reason and spirit" clause might have excluded his testimony); Keyes v. Gore, 42
NOTES
"A4dverse Party"
The statute provides that a party shall not testify when the "ad-
verse party" is any of the following: the guardian or trustee of either
a deaf and dumb or an insane person, or of a child of a deceased per-
son; an executor or administrator; one who claims or defends as heir,
grantee, assignee, devisee, or legatee of a deceased person.3 7
"ldverse"
The courts have determined that a party is not disqualified by the
Dead Man Statute unless his interest is opposed to that of the execu-
tor, administrator, heir, or others specifically named by the statute.3 8
Thus, in an action by plaintiff to recover for services allegedly ren-
dered the deceased under an implied contract, it was held that the
sole legatee, who was a party defendant, was competent to testify on
behalf of the executor of the deceased's estate, in that the legatee's
interest was adverse to the plaintiff, rather than to the estate.9 Fur-
ther, the parties must.be "adversely interested in the determination
of the issues, . . . but it matters not whether they are upon the same
side or opposite sides of the record."'
One area in which the courts have had difficulty in defining the
nature of the interests of the parties is in actions to determine heir-
ship. It has been held that one attempting to qualify as a common-
law spouse of a deceased person is incompetent to testify as to facts
tending to establish the existence of a common-law marriage.4 1  The
rationale of these decisions appears to be that the qualification of the
surviving spouse would decrease the -interest of others claiming an in-
Ohio St. 211 (1884) (if action to recover real property would also have conclusively deter-
mined widow's rights to dower, she might be barred from testifying even though she was not
a party). It should be noted that the personal property of a deceased person does not vest in
his heirs upon his death, but is in abeyance until the estate is administrated, even if there is
but one heir. Thus, an heir in this case would. not be a necessary nor a proper party to a suit.
McBride v. Vance, 73 Ohio St. 258 (1906) (syllabus 2). But see Bolen v. Humes, 94 Ohio
App. 1, 114 N.E.2d 281 (1951), wherein the wife of decedent was allowed to testify on be-
half of the executor in a suit by a legatee under decedents will excepting to the inventory
filed. Plaintiff had been bequeathed a ring, which item was missing from the inventory.
The wife testified that she had been given the ring by an inter vivos gift. This decision would
appear to be erroneous under the above dictum inasmuch as the judgment would be binding
on the wife with respect to the ownership of the ring.
37. OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.03 (Supp. 1959).
38. Anderson v. Houpt, 43 Ohio App. 538, 184 N.E. 29 (1932); Walkey v. Loney, 13 Ohio
App. 393 (1919), aff'd on another ground, 102 Ohio St. 18, 130 N.E. 158 (1921); see
Cochran v. Almack, 39 Ohio St. 314 (1883).
39. Anderson v. Houpt, supra note 38.
40. Hubbell v. Hubbell, 22 Ohio St. 208, 221 (1871).
41. Lynch v. Romas, 139 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Dibble v. Dibble, 88 Ohio
App. 490, 100 N.E.2d 451 (1950), motion to certify denied, April 19, 1950; Brawley v.
Thomas, 82 Ohio App. 400, 81 N.E.2d 719 (1947); In re Estate of Goetge, 6 Ohio Supp.
(N.E. Reporter) 89 (P. Ct. 1940).
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terest in the estate, who must be made parties to the action.42 Thus,
one claiming as a common-law spouse is deemed to be adverse in in-
terest to other claimants of the estate, who are protected by the
statute. However, at least one court has not applied the same rea-
soning where a claimant in heirship was a person other than one pur-
porting to be a common-law spouse.43 In that case, the court allowed
the alleged sister of the decedent to testify as to facts tending to
prove the relationship in issue. The court distinguished the common-
law spouse cases on the tenuous ground that the qualification of one
as the sister of the decedent would not decrease the value of the es-
tate; rather, it would only determine among whom the estate would
be distributed.4 4  It would seem that the true rationale for the dis-
tinction is that, as a matter of public policy, the courts hold common-
law marriages in disfavor.45
"Guardian"
In most cases, it is dear whether or not the adverse party is a
guardian, trustee, or other person protected by the statute. How-
ever, in some instances the applicability of the statute has been ques-
tioned. The protection of the statute applies where a judicial deter-
mination has been made that the person is insane and a guardian has
been appointed.46  Conversely, it does not apply where a guardian
ad litem defends or prosecutes an action.47  The reasoning of the
court is that to allow the statute to operate in the latter situation
would be to encourage fraud, because any party can have a trustee
appointed ex parte, and thus prevent the testimony of the adverse
party.48
A party has been held to be incompetent to testify against the
guardian of an insane person even though the insanity was not offi-
cially declared until after the occurrence which formed the basis of
the action. 49  The same result obtains despite the fact that the evi-
dence offered is not within the knowledge of the insane person prior
to the appointment of a guardian.50
42. OHIo REv. CODE § 2123.02.
43. O'Shaughnessy v. Stefft, 117 N.E.2d 734 (Ohio P. Ct. 1953).
44. Id. at 736.
45. See Brastein v. Sedivy, 153 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio P. Ct. 1957).
46. Sacks v. Johnson, 76 Ohio App. 143, 63 N.E.2d 246 (1943); Nolan v. Haberer, 3 Ohio
App. 45 (1914).
47. Torrance v. Torrance, 147 Ohio St. 169, 177-78, 70 N.E.2d, 365, 369 (1946).
48. Id. at 175-77, 70 N.E.2d at 368-69. The court stated that a guardian ad litem is not the
real party in interest nor the adverse party.
49. Nolan v. Haberer, 3 Ohio App. 45 (1862) (syllabus 1).
50. Ibid.
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"Grantee"
The statute provides that when the adverse party claims or de-
fends as grantee of a deceased person, the other party shall not
testify. It has been held, however, that each grantee of the decedent
is competent to testify against the other in an action to determine
which land should be sold first to satisfy a mortgage.51 The court
stated that even though both parties were claiming or defending as
grantees, the Dead Man Statute was not applicable inasmuch as
neither party was directly attacking the grant.52
"Assignee"
When a party claims to be an assignee of a decedent, a question
of fact is presented which must be determined by the jury.53  In this
situation, the other party is not an incompetent witness, but may
testify generally. However, if the jury finds that the adverse party
is in fact an assignee, then the testimony of the other party must be
disregarded.54
It should be noted that even though the assignor of a chose in
action would be a competent witness in an action against the adminis-
trator of the estate of a debtor under the Dead Man Statute,55 the
assignor is now barred from testifying by a section of the Privileged
Communication Statute.56 The latter section provides that the as-
signor may not testify when the assignee is barred from testifying.
If, under the Dead Man Statute, the assignee would be incompetent
to testify, by the operation of the two statutes, the assignor is also
incompetent. 7  The effect is to rectify the prior inequity, whereby
one could avoid the operation of the Dead Man Statute merely by
assigning his claim against the deceased's estate. 8
WAIVER OF THE STATUTE
Over a period of years, a number of exceptions have been ap-
pended to the Dead Man Statute. Some of these exceptions limit the
51. Sternberger v. Hanna, 42 Ohio St. 305 (1884).
52. Id. at 308.
53. Smith v. Barrick, 151 Ohio St. 201, 85 N.E.2d 101 (1949).
54. Ibid. Mr. Justice Mathias, concurring, said that this determination should be made by
the trial judge, rather than by the jury. Id. at 209, 85 N.E.2d at 105 (concurring opinion).
Mr. Justice Taft, although agreeing in principle with Mr. Justice Mathias, stated that in this
particular case the decision should have turned upon a different construction of the pleading.
Id. at 210, 85 N.E.2d at 106, (concurring opinion). If the latter interpretation were deemed
to be correct, the value of this majority opinion as precedent is considerably weakened.
55. Myres v. Walker, 9 Ohio St. 558 (1859).
56. Oxno REv. CODE § 2317.02(D).
57. See Snow v. Fulton, 51 Ohio App. 514, 2 N.E.2d 12 (1936). See note 22 supra.
58. Myres v. Walker, 9 Ohio St. 558 (1859) (decided prior to the adoption of § 2317.-
.02 (D)).
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scope of the statute, whereas others provide for the waiver of its
protection. The following sub-sections, which limit the scope of the
statute, provide that a party shall not testify, except:
(1) As to facts which occurred after the appointment of the
guardian or trustee of an insane person, and, in the other cases, after
the time the decedent, grantor, assignor, or testator died.59
(2) When the action or proceeding relates to a contract made
through an agent by a person since deceased, and the agent is competent
to testify as a witness, a party may testify on the same subject.60
(3) In an action or proceeding by or against a partner or joint con-
tractor, the adverse party shall not testify to transactions with, or admis-
sions by, a partner or joint contractor since deceased, unless they were
made in the presence of the surviving partner or joint contractor, and
this rule applies without regard to the character in which the parties
sue or are sued.61
(4) If the claim or defense is founded on a book account, a party
may testify that the book is his account book, that it is a book of original
entries, that the entries therein were made in the regular course of
business by himself, a person since deceased, or a disinterested person,
and the book is then competent evidence in any case, without regard to
the parties, upon like proof by any competent witness.62
While no attempt is made at an extensive discussion of these ex-
ceptions, because they bear no relation to waiver, a few of the more
salient features of the first exception listed above are deserving of
mention.63  This exception limits the protection of the Dead Man
Statute to facts occurring prior to the time of the decedent's death or
to the appointment of a guardian for an insane person.' Thus, in
an action against an administrator to recover on an oral contract, the
plaintiff was not only held incompetent as to the essence of a con-
versation allegedly had by him with the deceased, but was also in-
competent to testify as to the fact of the conversation. "5 Further,
the protection of the statute extends to a fact which existed after the
death of the deceased, but which occurred prior to such death. There-
fore, the assignor of a claim 6 was held incompetent to testify with
respect to an assignment made prior to decedent's death, and which
was in full force and effect subsequent to his death. The Hamilton
County Court of Appeals has had difficulty in determining whether
59. Omo REV. CODE 5 2317.03(A) (Supp. 1959).
60. OHIo REv. CODE 5 2317.03 (B) (Supp. 1959).
61. OHIO REV. CODE 52317.03(E) (Supp. 1959).
62. OHIO REV. CODE 5 2317.03(F) (Supp. 1959).
63. For a complete discussion of these exceptions, see Note, 4 WEsT. REv. L. Rv. 61, 66
(1952).
64. In re Estate of Decker, 81 Ohio App. 217, 78 N.E.2d 686 (1946).
65. Southard v. Curson, 13 Ohio App. 289 (1920) (syllabus 1).
66. For a discussion of the disqualification of an assignor when the assignee is incompetent
to testify, see note 56 supra and accompanying text.
67. Price v. Cleveland Trust Co., 81 Ohio App. 221, 77 N.E.2d 621 (1947).
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testimony with respect to the identification of a signature made prior
to the death of the decedent relates to a fact occurring prior to death
within the meaning of the statute. In a 1936 case,68 a surviving part-
ner was held to be incompetent to testify as to the handwriting of a
deceased partner in the former's action against the estate. In a 1948
case,69 the same court held that the plaintiff had not waived the pro-
tection of the statute by questioning the defendant as on cross-exami-
nation with respect to the genuineness of the defendant's signature,
allegedly affixed upon a note as co-signer, prior to the death of the
deceased maker. Thus, it appears implicit from the court's decision
that the genuineness of the defendant's signature was considered to
be a fact occurring subsequent to death. In the earlier case, the rea-
soning of the court was that identification of the handwriting of a
deceased person must be based upon knowledge gained prior to the
deceased's death.70 If this rationale were applied to the later case,
the two decisions could be reconciled inasmuch as the party in that
case was testifying as to the genuineness of his own signature. How-
ever, in each case, the essence of the testimony went to the fact of
the writing, which fact, although in existence subsequent to the de-
ceased's death, occurred prior to such death. Therefore, in view of
the language of the statute, the testimony should have been excluded
in both cases. Although this conclusion may seem to be contrary to
the purpose of the statute, so long as it remains in force, it is desir-
able that the courts' interpretations be consistent with the wording of
the statute, thus leaving to the legislature the task of annexing amend-
ments thereto.
It should be noted that with respect to testimony against the
guardian of an insane person, the date of the appointment of the
guardian strictly controls what facts are admissible. Thus, in an
action for personal injury against the guardian of an insane person,
the testimony concerning the injury was excluded because the guardian
was appointed subsequent to the injury, although the person was in
fact insane for some time prior to the injury.1
Another exception that severely restricts the protection of the
Dead Man Statute provides as follows:
Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for causing death, or
actions or proceedings involving the validity of a deed, will, or codicil.72
68. Steigert v. Steigert, 57 Ohio App. 255, 15 N.E.2d 583 (1936).
69. Pfister v. Walter, 83 Ohio App. 156, 82 N.E.2d 768 (1948).
70. Steigert v. Steigert, 57 Ohio App. 255, 261, 13 N.Y.2d 583, 586 (1936).
71. Nolan v. Haberer, 3 Ohio App. 45 (1914). This case illustrates the difficulty of draft-
ing an exclusionary statute which will do justice in every case. The court was also bothered
by this, but felt compelled to hold as they did because of a prior case, Ransom v. Haberer &
Co., 13 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 511 (1910), aff'd without opinion, 85 Ohio St. 483, 98 N. E.
1131 (1912). The court did not even feel that the "reason and spirit" clause would allow
them to hold otherwise. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
72. OHIO REV. CODE 5 2317.03 (Supp. 1959).
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The word "validity" has been narrowly construed by the Ohio Su-
preme Court as being equivalent in meaning to "legal sufficiency."
Consequently, an action which, in essence, is one to engraft a con-
structive trust upon a deed, has been held not to be an action "involv-
ing the validity of a deed."'7-
Exceptions Relating to Waiver
Four exceptions to the statute relate directly or indirectly to the
waiver of its protection. One of these is that:
If after testifying orally, a party dies, the evidence may be proved by
either party on a further trial of the case, whereupon the opposite party
may testify to the same matter.74
Prior to the enactment of this exception, the testimony of a deceased
person could be introduced by means of a deposition. 7  However, if
a person died after testifying, proof of his testimony was inadmis-
sible in a further trial of the case, since it was not offered by deposi-
tion.70 It was to correct this situation that the above exception was
enacted. Although the supreme court has not construed this particu-
lar exception, there are a number of recent appellate cases which have
interpreted a similar provision contained in Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2317.06. The requirement that the testimony sought to be in-
troduced must be "on a further trial of the case," has been narrowly
construed.77 The few lower court cases which have interpreted the
"further trial" provision of the Dead Man Statute have similarly re-
stricted its scope.78  One early common pleas court decision held that
the "opposite party" referred to in the statute meant "the party op-
posing the deceased person and his successor in interest. ' 79  Under
this interpretation, the court permitted the party adverse to the es-
tate to introduce the prior recorded testimony of the deceased party,
and then allowed the former to testify as to the same matters.80 If
the interpretation given by this court is correct, then this exception
does not in this situation provide for a complete waiver of the pro-
tection of the statute. The testimony of the decedent was not offered
voluntarily by his personal representative, but, rather, was introduced
by the opposing party. It is generally held that waiver can only be
73. Rieger v. Hotel Rieger Co., 124 Ohio St. 152, 177 N.E. 211 (1931).
74. OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.03(G) (Supp. 1959).
75. For a discussion of the exception relating to the introduction of the deposition of a party
since deceased, see notes 82-85 infra and accompanying text.
76. Hoover v. Jennings, 11 Ohio St. 624 (1860).
77. See Note, 11 WEST. RES. L. REv. 471, 475 (1960).
78. Bender v. Vaughn, 106 Ohio App. 136, 153 N.E.2d 778 (1958); Conett v. Squair, 17
Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 65, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 558 (Munic. Ct. 1906).
79. Matthews v. Heider, 22 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 399, 400 (C.P. 1912).
'80. Ibid.
(September
created by a voluntary act on the part of the holder of the privilege, 1
which in this case was the personal representative of the decedent.
It is an open question whether the introduction of the prior recorded
testimony of the decedent by his administrator would constitute a
complete waiver of the statute's protection in view of the wording
of this exception which permits the other party to "testify to the
same matter."
Another exception provides that
If a party dies and his deposition be offered in evidence the opposite
party may testify as to all competent matters therein.82
It has been held that either party may introduce the deposition of
the decedent.83  Further, the term "opposite party" has been con-
strued to include the party adverse to the estate even though it was
the adverse party who offered the deposition in evidence.8 4 This
is true even though the testimony of the decedent was elicited by
deposition as on cross-examination. 5 In this situation, only a limited
waiver is created as per the terms of the statute. However, as with
the prior exception, the question remains open whether there would
be a complete waiver if the deposition were offered by the personal
representative of the decedent.
A further exception to the statute states that"
If a party offers evidence of conversations or admissions of the oppo-
site party, the latter may testify concerning the same conversations or
admissions. 8
There appears to be but one Ohio Supreme Court decision
that has interpreted this exception. 7 In this case, decedent's execu-
trix called plaintiff as on cross-examination, and examined him with
respect to certain transactions. The trial court then refused plaintiff
81. Goehring v. Dillard, 145 Ohio St. 41, 51, 60 N.E2d 704, 708 (1945) (dissenting
opinion); see Verbsky v. Burger, 146 Ohio St. 235, 65 NXE.2d 695 (1946) (dictum); Hickox
v. Rogers, 33 Ohio App. 97, 168 N.E. 750 (1928).
82. OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.03 (H) (Supp. 1959).
83. Goehnng v. Dillard, 145 Ohio St. 41, 60 N.E.2d 704 (1945). However, the compe-
tency of the testimony contained therein is determined by the circumstances at the rime of
trial, not at the time the deposition was taken. St. Clair v. Orr, 16 Ohio St. 220 (1865)
84. Ibu,
85. Ibid.
86. OHIo REv. CODE § 2317.03(D) (Supp. 1959). A 1955 amendment to this sub-
section (126 Ohio Laws 39 (1955)) provides that " if evidence of declaration against
interest made by an insane, incompetent, or deceased person has been admitted, then any
oral or written declaration made by such insane, incompetent, or deceased person concerning
the same subject to which any such admitted evidence relates, and which but for this provision
would be excluded as self-serving, shall be admitted in evidence if it be proved to the satis-
faction of the trial judge that the declaration was made at a time when the declarant was com-
petent to testify, concerning a subject matter in issue, and, when no apparent motive to mis-
represent appears." Since this amendment relates only to the "hearsay rule," its interpretation
and application is not within the scope of this note.
87. Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 165 N. E. 727 (1929).
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the right to testify in general as to all the issues in the case, but,
rather, restricted plaintiff to those transactions about which he pre-
viously had been questioned by the executrix. The supreme court
held this to be reversible error. It stated that the legislature, by
the enactment of this exception, did not intend to limit the common-
law rule of evidence, that one who is called as on cross-examination
by the adverse party may testify in chief as to all the issues in the
case."' The court interpreted the statute as expanding the right of
testimony by allowing a party adverse to the executor to testify where
the executor has offered evidence of conversations or admissions of
such adverse party through a non-party. It is only in this situation,
which was not provided for at common law, that the limiting phrase,
"concerning the same conversations or admissions," was intended to
apply."9
"Conversations or admissions," within the meaning of the statute,
have been interpreted to encompass only oral statements.0  This in-
terpretation would appear to be unnecessarily restrictive in that "con-
versation" denotes the spoken word, whereas "admission" is broad
enough to include written statements.
The final exception to the Dead Man Statute states that:
If a party, or one having a direct interest, testifies to transactions
or conversations with another party, the latter may testify as to the same
transactions or conversations. 91
It is clear from the wording of the statute that if one having a
direct interest testifies as to transactions or conversations with the
party adverse to the estate, a limited waiver occurs which permits the
adverse party to testify as to the same transactions only. If the ad-
ministrator himself testifies, it is equally clear that the testimony of
the adverse party which relates to the same transaction cannot be ex-
cluded. Whether such testimony by the administrator creates only
a limited waiver as per the terms of the statute, or a complete waiver
of the statute, must be deemed to be an open question. 93
On the one hand, it would seem to be giving the administrator an
unfair advantage to allow him to testify only with respect to conver-
sations favorable to him, and at the same time limit the adverse
party's testimony to the same transaction. On the other hand, such
88. In support of this proposition, the court cited Legg v. Drake, I Ohio St. 286 (1853).
89. Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 212, 165 N.E. 727, 729 (1929).
90. Jackson v. Ely, 57 Ohio St. 450, 49 N.E. 792 (1897). Contra, Beach v. Baker, 151
N.E.2d 677 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
91. OHIo REV. CODE § 2317.03(C) (Supp. 1959).
92. Rankin v. Hannan, 38 Ohio St. 438 (1882).
93. Under the rationale of Rankin v. Hannan, supra note 92, the limited waiver interpreta-
tion would seem to be correct in that the court stated that the exceptions to the Dead Man
Statute are "based upon the principle of mutuality of right." Id. But see Westrick v. Unter-
brink, 90 Ohio App. 283, 105 N.E.2d 885 (1950).
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an interpretation conforms to the precise wording of the statute.
However, a possible explanation for the enactment of the exception is
that the legislature intended to liberalize the rules for admitting testi-
mony by allowing the party adverse to the estate to testify as to con-
versations or transactions upon which testimony had previously been
given on behalf of the administrator "by one having a direct interest"
in the action."4
Non-Statutory Waiver
In addition to the exceptions noted above which permit waiver
under certain circumstances, it is well settled that waiver can be ef-
fected through non-statutory means. However, there is still con-
siderable question in some situations as to when and how waiver can
arise.
Nature of the Privilege
The landmark case of Roberts v. Briscoe,"95 decided in 1887, de-
termined that an administrator may compel a party adverse to the
estate to testify as to facts which occurred prior to the death of the
decedent. The court held that the language, "a party shall not
testify," created a privilege, not a prohibition, and that such privilege
could be waived.
[W]hat is intended for the benefit and protection of the estate
should not be permitted to operate as a source of injury.... The legis-
lature could not have designed to place the estates of deceased persons
at such disadvantage by depriving them of evidence, within reach, neces-
sary to their protection against imposition and fraud. The adverse and
surviving party, when compelled to testify by the executor or adminis-
trator can not reasonably complain; for, though a party, he can then be
examined fully in his own behalf....oP
Ten years after its decision in Roberts v. Briscoe, the supreme
court was faced with the question of the competency of either party
in an action by one administrator against another administrator. In
holding that neither party was competent to testify against the
other,97 some shadow may have been cast over the prior holding that
the statute created a privilege. It was not until almost fifty years
later that the court was again faced with this difficult question.
Ferbsky v. Burger"' created dissension among the members of the
court and raised serious problems for students of the law. In that
case, the opposing parties both claimed as heirs of a deceased person.
94. See note 89 supra and accompanying text for the same kind of interpretation of an
analogous section.
95. 44 Ohio St. 596, 10 N.E. 61 (1887).
96. Id. at 602, 10 N.E. at 64.
97. Farley v. Lisey, 55 Ohio St. 627, 45 N.E. 1103 (1897) (syllabus 1).
98. 146 Ohio St. 235, 65 N.E.2d 695 (1946).
19601
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Upon objection by the defendant, the trial court refused to permit the
plaintiff to examine the defendant as on cross-examination. In af-
firming the decision of the lower court, Mr. Chief Justice Weygandt,
speaking for the majority, stated that the Dead Man Statute "pro-
vides specifically and unambiguously that 'a party shall not testify' -
language too plain to require construction." '99 Further, the Chief Jus-
tice reasoned that the proffered testimony did not come within any
of the eight exceptions to the statute, and that these exceptions were
the exclusive means by which the disqualification of a witness could
be removed.'
Mr. Justice Mathias'"' and Mr. Justice Hart,0 2 in their dissent-
ing opinions, called attention to many cases decided by the supreme
court and by the lower courts wherein it had been held that the statute
created only a privilege, which privilege was capable of waiver by the
decedent's personal representative. 03
It seems clear that when only one party is protected by the statute,
he may waive its protection.' If both parties are protected by the
statute, the governing principles appear to be the same - the statute
permits the administrator to protect the estate against fraud by ex-
cluding the testimony of the opposite party. However, when he
deems it advantageous to allow the adverse party to speak, he should
not be precluded from doing so. The fact that both parties are pro-
tected by the statute should not alter the nature of the statutory pro-
tection: it creates a privilege, not a prohibition.
Raising the Privilege
An early case had held that under the Dead Man Statute the
court had the duty of objecting to the competency of a party in the
absence of objection by a party protected by the statute.'0 5 The ra-
tionale was that the statute created an absolute prohibition which was
incapable of waiver by the protected party. This concept was soon
rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court. 06 It is now well settled that a
party in whose favor the statute operates can waive its protection,
and that a failure to raise the privilege by timely objection constitutes
such a waiver.07 Further, the waiver is not confined to the trial in
99. Id. at 237, 65 N.E.2d at 696.
100. Ibid.
101. Id. at 239, 65 N.E.2d at 697 (dissenting opinion).
102. Id. at 242, 65 N.E.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion).
103. See, e.g., In re Estate of Alger, 10 Ohio App. 93 (1918) (where both parties are dis-
abled by the statute to testify, if one party calls the other as on cross-examination, a waiver
occurs, thereby allowing the other party to testify in his own behalf).
104. See, e.g., Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 596, 10 N.E. 61 (1887).
105. Brown v. A Raft of Timber, 1 Handy 13, 12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 1 (Super. Ct. 1854).
106. Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 596, 10 N.E. 61 (1887).
107. Crowe v. Vickery, 23 Ohio App. 83, 155 N.E. 247 (1927).
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which it occurs, but extends, as well, to a subsequent trial of the same
case.
108
A privilege belongs to the holder thereof, and, thus, any of the
parties protected by the statute may claim the privilege or waive it
as to themselves. 10 9 Conversely, there is no privilege in the party
adverse to the estate." 0
When excluding testimony, the objection may be made by the pro-
tected party on the ground of the incompetency of the witness or the
incompetency of the testimony."' However, it is generally held that
where the trial court excludes evidence in reliance upon the Dead
Man Statute, no proffer is required by the party seeking to introduce
the evidence in order to lay a foundation for appeal."' This is true
because the exclusion of evidence under the statute relates to the in-
competency of the witness, rather than to the incompetency of the
testimony, and when evidence is so excluded, prejudice will be pre-
sumed by the reviewing court." 3  However, when evidence is compe-
tent against one party, but incompetent as to another, it is not error
to admit such evidence." 4 If the protected party makes only a gen-
eral objection, which is overruled, it is not error to admit the evidence
as against both parties." 5 In order to preserve the protection of the
statute, the party against whom the evidence is incompetent may re-
quire the court to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for
which such evidence is admitted." 6 If the protected party makes only
a general objection, and the objection is sustained, it is then incum-
bent upon the opposite party to request the admission of the evidence
as to the party against whom the evidence is competent. If the oppo-
108. Niederlehner v. Weatherly, 78 Ohio App. 263, 269, 69 N.E.2d 787, 791 (1946).
see also Choteau v. Thompson, 3 Ohio St. 424 (1854).
109. See Atley v. Atley, 20 Ohio App. 497, 152 N.E. 761 (1925) (heir, who was a neces-
sary party, allowed to waive the privilege in suit against executor and the heir).
110. In re Renee, 159 Ohio St. 37, 45, 110 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
111. Farley v. Lisey, 55 Ohio St. 627, 45 N.E. 1103 (1897) (per curiam). An objection
to the testimony on the ground of incompetency was held sufficient, the reason being that
with respect to matters coming within the exception, the witness was competent. Id. at 631,
45 N.E. at 1103.
112. Totten v. Estate of Miller, 139 Ohio St. 29, 37 N.E.2d 961 (1941); Loney v. Walkey,
102 Ohio St. 18, 130 N.E. 158 (1921); Wolf v. Powner, 30 Ohio St. 472 (1876) (syllabus
2); Schlarman v. Heyn, 19 Ohio App. 64 (1923) (syllabus 1). But see Weaver v. City of
Mt. Vernon, 36 Ohio App. 358, 173 N.E. 249 (1930), wherein the court refused to presume
the exclusion of the deceased's prior recorded testimony to be prejudicial, because the testi-
mony related to a non-decisive issue.
113. Ibid.
114. Totten v. Estate of Miller, 139 Ohio St. 29, 37 N.E.2d 961 (1941); Hubbell v. Hub-
bell, 22 Ohio St. 208 (1871). Cf. Fielder v. Ohio Edison Co., 158 Ohio St. 375, 109 N.E.2d
855 (1952) (two causes of action).
115. Although there appears to be no Ohio decision directly in point, see Kent v. State, 42
Ohio St. 426 (1884), which supports this proposition. See generally Annot., 106 A.L.R.
467 (1937).
116. Hubbell v. Hubbell, 22 Ohio St. 208 (1871); see Carl v. Caldwell, 71 Ohio App. 339,
50 N.E.2d 182 (1942).
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site party fails to make such a request, he waives the exclusion of the
evidence as a ground for error."7
W aiver by Cross-Examination
It is clear that the personal representative of the deceased can
call the adverse party as on cross-examination." 8 Further, if testi-
mony is elicited with respect to facts occurring prior to the death of
the deceased," 9 the adverse party then becomes competent to testify
as to all the issues of the case.120
The Ohio Revised Code provides generally that a party can take
the deposition of the adverse party as on cross-examination. 12' How-
ever, it has been held that the mere taking and filing of the deposition
of the party adverse to the estate, which deposition is not offered in
evidence, does not waive the protection of the Dead Man Statute. 22
From this holding there has evolved a rule of doubtful logic. In
1953, the Ohio Supreme Court held in In re Renee123 that the per-
sonal representative of a deceased person could not require the ad-
verse party to give testimony on deposition with respect to matters
occurring prior to the death of the deceased. The rationale was that
the estate should not be allowed to gain information by way of de-
position which would otherwise be unavailable to it without effecting
a waiver. 24 It is clear from the language of the court that a waiver
for purposes of deposition only is not a sufficient waiver to compel
the testimony of the adverse party.125 However, it is not clear from
the court's opinion whether the estate could ever waive the protection
of the statute prior to trial, and thereby compel the adverse party to
testify.2 6  However, in a case decided in 1959,127 wherein the court
117. Carl v. Caldwell, supra note 116.
118. E.g., Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 596, 10 N.E. 61 (1887); Atley v. Atley, 20 Ohio
App. 497, 152 N.E. 761 (1925).
119. See Pfister v. Walter, 83 Ohio App. 156, 82 N.E.2d 768 (1948), where the court
held that testimony elicited from the party adverse to the estate concerning the genuineness of a
signature did not constitute a waiver of the privilege. See discussion note 69 supra and ac-
companying text.
120. Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 165 N.E. 727 (1929); Severns v. Boylan, 75 Ohio
App. 15, 20, 22, 60 N.E.2d 521, 524 (1944); I.; re Estate of Alger, 10 Ohio App. 93, 98-99
(1918).
121. OHio REV. CODE § 2317.07.
122. Prince v. Abersold, 123 Ohio St. 464, 175 N.E. 862 (1931).
123. 159 Ohio St. 37, 110 N.E.2d 795 (1953) (4-3 decision).
124. But see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Taft in In re Renee, 159 Ohio St. 37, 44, 110
N.E.2d 795 (1953), wherein he asserts that the right to take a deposition must be distinguished
from the right to use the deposition, and, thus, there need be no waiver before the estate can
compel the adverse party to testify as on cross-examination. In his opinion, the majority view,
in effect, allows the party adverse to the estate to assert the privilege. Id. at 45, 110 N.E.2d at
799.
125. In re Renee, 159 Ohio St. 37, 40, 110 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1953).
126. Id. at 41, 110 N.E.2d at 798.
127. In re Scholl, 170 Ohio St. 205, 163 N.E.2d 389 (1959) (per curiam).
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followed its holding in In re Renee, Mr. Justice Taft, in his concur-
ring opinion, stated:
That case represents at least a holding that, until the executor waives
the incompetency of such opposite party, either expressly or by offering
his testimony *at the trial, such opposite party cannot be required to
testify as a witness.128 (Emphasis added.)
It is possible to interpret the language contained in both of these, de-
cisions as allowing a complete express waiver of the statute at the
time of deposition. Certainly, if the decision in In re Renee is to be
followed, the result of that decision should not be to withhold from
the estate information necessary to the preparation of its case. How-
ever, the waiver, once effected, should be binding upon the estate and,
thus, should carry over to the trial of the case. 29
It should be noted that waiver of the statute cannot be effected by
the party adverse to the estate calling the personal representative of
the deceased as on cross-examination. 30 The rationale of this rule
is that a waiver can be effected only by the voluntary testimony of the
personal representative. In view of the code provision allowing the
adverse party to be called as on cross-examination,131 a contrary rule
would completely nullify the protection of the Dead Man Statute.3 2
Waiver by Direct Testimony
As has been noted previously,'5 8 an exception to the Dead Man
Statute provides in part that if a party testifies as to "transactions or
conversations with another party, the latter may testify as to the same
transactions or conversations."'3 4  As has also been noted, the ques-
tion is an open one as to whether this exception creates a complete
waiver of the statute, or one limited to testimony concerning "the
same transactions or conversations."
With respect to facts not within the scope of this exception, e.g.,
transactions with the deceased rather than with "another party,"
testimoiy by the personal representative of the deceased apparently
would effect a complete waiver of the statute'3 5
128. Id. at 206, 163 N.E.2d at 390 (concurring opinion).
129. The rule of the Renee case also prohibits the personal representative of the decedent
from requiring the adverse party to produce papers and documents regarding matters occurring
prior to the death of the decedent. In re Renee, 159 Ohio St. 37, 110 NE.2d 795 (1953)(syllabus 2).
130. Hickox v. Rogers, 33 Ohio App. 97, 168 N.E. 750 (1928). See also Verbsky v. Bur-
ger, 146 Ohio St. 235, 65 N.E.2d 695 (1946) (dictum).
131. Orno REv. CODE § 2317.07.
132. But see Goehring v. Dillard, 145 Ohio St., 41, 60 N.E.2d 704 (1945), wherein the court
held that under exception (H) to the Dead Man Statute, a partial waiver was created by the
introduction in evidence by the party adverse to the estate of the deposition of the decedent
taken as on cross-examination. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
134. Omo REV. CODE § 2317.03(C) (Supp. 1959).
135. Westrick v. Unterbrink, 90.Ohio App. 283, 105 N.E.2d 885 (1950).
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CONCLUSION
The Dead Man Statute has been a prime source of litigation in
Ohio for more than a century, and, yet, from the foregoing, it is ap-
parent that few rules are settled with respect to its application. This
uncertainty is particularly manifest with respect to waiver. Although
greater consistency and clarity in the decisions by the courts would
be of assistance, that is not a complete solution. The decisions have
been incapable of prediction and have frequently turned upon tenuous
grounds because of the language of the statute. Still, it would be
difficult to word a statute which would clearly convey the intention
of the legislature to protect estates from fraudulent claims, and at
the same time, to allow testimony in situations wherein justice would
best be served. Perhaps the basic deficiency in the statute is the pol-
icy consideration upon which it is based, the validity of which is not
free from question.
"Statutes which exclude testimony on this ground [protection of the
estates of the dead] are of doubtful expediency. There are more honest
claims defeated by them, by destroying the evidence to prove such claim,
than there would be fictitious claims established if all enactments were
swept away and all persons rendered competent witnesses. To assume
that in any event many false claims would be established by perjury is
to place an extremely low estimate on human nature, and a very high
estimate on human ingenuity and adroitness.' 3136
As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded inter-
est-qualification is deplorable in every respect; for it is based on a
fallacious and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more false
decision than it prevents, and it encumbers the profession with a profuse
mass of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere words.' 3 7
These passages quoted from Wigmore's famous treatise on the Law
of Evidence strike at the very heart of the problem.
Because of its dissatisfaction with the basic disqualification provi-
sion of the Dead Man Statute, the legislature has seen fit to enact
numerous exceptions. The result has been a chaotic mass of litiga-
tion. Neither the legislative enactment nor the judicial decisions have
achieved the purpose for which all rules of evidence are promulgated
the orderly administration of justice.
The solution lies not in the enactment of more exceptions, but in
the abolition of the Dead Man Statute.
SHELDON I. BERNS
JAMES A. YOUNG
136. 2 WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940) quoting from St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D.
140, 143, 64 N.W. 930, 931 (1895).
137. 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 136, § 578.
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